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Abstract 
 
Do people discriminate between men and women when they are in charge of punishing 
defectors or rewarding cooperators? Answering this question has potentially far-reaching 
implications on gender equity, since cooperative behaviour forms the basis of our societies 
and is typically enforced through punishment or rewarding. In this paper we report on two 
pre-registered experiments, that we hope shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N=1,077) 
shows that people do not discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing 
(rewarding) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot public goods game. In this study, 
punishment/reward is implemented by asking participants whether they want to pay a cost to 
decrease/increase the payoff of a defector/cooperator. Study 2 (N=253) extends Study 1 to a 
different method of punishing/rewarding; participants are asked to rate the behaviour of a 
defector/cooperator from 1 to 5 stars. In this case too, we find that people do not discriminate 
between genders. All these results are robust to splitting the sample by gender: in our context, 
neither men nor women discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing 
defectors or rewarding cooperators. 
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Introduction 
 
Do people discriminate between men and women when they are in charge of punishing 
defectors or rewarding cooperators? Answering this question has potentially far-reaching 
implications on gender equity, since cooperative behaviour forms the basis of our societies 
and is typically enforced through punishment or rewarding (Andreoni, Harbaugh, & 
Vesterlund, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & 
Rockenbach, 2006; Hilbe & Sigmund, 2010; Milinski, Semmann, Krambeck, & Marotzke, 
2006; Nowak, 2006; Perc et al. 2017).  
 
Previous work has mainly focused on whether men and women punish differently, rather than 
on whether they are punished differently. A handful of studies explored gender differences in 
rejection rates in the ultimatum game. In this game, the proposer makes an offer to the 
responder about how to split a sum of money. The responder can either accept the offer (in 
which case the money is split as agreed) or reject the offer (in which case neither the proposer 
nor the responder get any money). Therefore, rejecting a low offer can be interpreted as a 
form of punishment for the violation of the norm of fairness (Crockett et al. 2010; 
Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014). In terms of gender differences, Eckel and Grossman 
(2001) reported that women are more likely than men to accept low offers; by contrast, 
Solnick (2001) found the opposite, that women are less likely than men to accept low offers; 
in line with the latter work, García-Gallego, Georgantzís, and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012) 
found that women are more likely to reject low offers; finally, Bueno-Guerra, Leiva, Colell, 
and Call (2016) found no gender differences in rejection rates among little girls and little 
boys between 6 and 10 years. To the best of our knowledge, only one work explored whether 
the two genders differ in the way they punish defectors in games involving cooperation. 
Burnham (2018) investigated gender differences in punishment in two versions of the public 
goods game. In the standard, baseline version, four players were asked whether they wanted 
to contribute (part of) a given endowment to a public pool. The total amount in the public 
pool was then multiplied by 1.6 and equally divided among all players. In this way, it is 
individually optimal not to contribute to the public pool, but if neither player contributes, 
then all participants are worse off than if they had all contributed. In the “rank based” variant, 
participants with high payoffs earned an extra bonus, while participants with low payoffs 
incurred a penalty. In doing so, Burnham observed no gender differences in punishment in 
the standard public goods game, but he observed that men punish more in the “rank based” 
variant. Although important in their domain, these studies do not allow us to answer our 
research questions. As mentioned above, none of the studies explored whether men and 
women are punished differently when they fail to cooperate. A secondary limitation is that 
none of these studies investigated whether women and men are discriminated in the way they 
are rewarded when they cooperate. 
 
In this paper, we move a step towards filling this gap through two pre-registered studies and a 
pre-study. In the pre-study, participants play a public goods game knowing that they might be 
rewarded or punished by an observer. Then, in Study 1, brand new participants are asked to 
reward or punish the behaviour of the participants in the pre-study. Reward and punishment 
are experimentally implemented in the standard way, by asking participants whether they 
want to pay a cost to increase/decrease the payoff of the participant of the pre-study with 
whom they are matched. Crucially, participants in Study 1 are given information about the 
gender of the participant in the pre-study. In this way, we can test whether the amount of 
punishment/reward depends on the gender of the participant who made a decision in the 
public goods game. First, we find that, in line with previous studies, people use this 
mechanism meaningfully: defectors are punished far more than cooperators, and cooperators 
are rewarded far more than defectors. Regarding our main research question, we find no 
significant gender differences: participants reward and punish women and men to a very 
similar extent. This remains true also when we split the sample by genders: neither men nor 
women discriminate among genders, when it comes to reward/punish their behaviour in our 
public goods game. In Study 2 we propose an extension of Study 1 to a different form of 
punishment and reward. Inspired by the recent development of online rating systems, in 
Study 2 participants can rate the behaviour of the participants of the pre-study from 1 to 5 
stars. In line with previous work, we find that participants use this rating meaningfully: 
cooperators receive, on average, a much greater rating than defectors (Capraro, Giardini, 
Vilone, & Paolucci, 2016). Coming to our main research question, in line with Study 1, we 
find that women and men are rated on average the same. And, as in Study 1, the same holds 
when we split the sample by gender: neither men nor women discriminate among genders, 
when they rate the behaviour of men and women in our public goods game. 
 
In sum, our results show that, at least in our studies, neither men nor women make gender 
discriminations when they are in charge of punishing or rewarding the behaviour of men and 
women in a public goods game. 
 
Related literature 
 
This paper is related to several streams of literature. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
closest line of research is that which explores gender differences in punishment in the 
ultimatum game (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; García-Gallego et al. 2012; 
Bueno-Guerra et al. 2016) and the public goods game (Burnham, 2018). Our work differs 
from this in that it does not look at whether men and women punish differently, but it looks at 
whether men and women are punished differently. Moreover, it also looks at the whether the 
two genders are rewarded differently. Finally, it does so also using a novel form of rating, 
inspired by online ratings. 
 
This work more generally relates to the huge literature on gender differences in decision 
making. Behavioural scientists have explored gender differences in several decisional 
domains, including competition (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; 
Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009), risk aversion (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999), cooperation 
(Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011; Rand, 2017), altruism (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; 
Engel, 2011; Rand et al. 2016; Brañas-Garza et al. 2018), honesty (Capraro, 2018; Abeler, 
Nosenzo, & Raymond, 2019; Gerlach, Teodorescu, & Hertwig, 2019), the equity-efficiency 
trade-off (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 2002; Fehr, Naef and 
Schmidt, 2006; Stieglitz, Gurven, Kaplan, and Hopfensitz, 2017; Capraro, 2019), and harm 
aversion (Fumagalli et al. 2010; Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015; Capraro & Sippel, 
2017). Our work differs from these papers, in that it explores gender differences in the way 
people discriminate the two genders when they are in charge of punishing defectors or 
rewarding cooperation; this type of gender difference was not previously explored. 
 
Our work also relates to the longstanding debate regarding whether women and men are 
penalized or rewarded differently for the same behaviour in the workplace. For example, 
Rudman (1998) found that self-promotion among women leads them to receive higher 
competence ratings, but it has the cost that they are perceived to be less socially attractive and 
hireable. Heilman and Chen (2005) found that women are penalized when they fail to act 
altruistically in the workplace, and they are not rewarded when they act altruistically; by 
contrast, men are rewarded when they act altruistically, and they are not penalized when they 
fail to act altruistically. Heilman and Chen also showed that this effect was driven by 
different prescriptive stereotypes. Bowles, Babcock, Lai (2007) found that evaluators 
penalize women more than men for initiating negotiations. Moreover, women were less 
inclined to negotiate with male evaluators. No gender differences were found when the 
evaluator was female. Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund and Weingart (2017) found that women 
are more likely than men to volunteer, asked to volunteer, and accept requests to volunteer 
for low promotability tasks. And this was partly driven by the beliefs that women are more 
likely than men to say yes to low promotability tasks. Several studies have shown that 
students rate female instructors less than their male counterparts (MacNell, 2015; Boring, 
2017; Mengel, Sauermann, & Zölitz, 2019). Our work differs from these because it focuses 
on cooperative behaviour in the stylized setting of a laboratory experiment using the public 
goods game. 
 
Pre-study 
 
In this preliminary study, we collect data regarding how participants play a public goods 
game (PGG) knowing that they might be rewarded or punished by a third party who will be 
communicated their contribution to the public good. This study serves two goals. On the one 
hand, it allows us to avoid deception in Study 1. On the other hand, it permits to compare the 
efficacy of punishment with the efficacy of reward in promoting cooperation in a one-shot 
public goods game. This is interesting in itself, because, it allows us to contribute to the 
literature comparing the effectiveness of these two mechanisms for promoting cooperation 
(Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011). 
 
Method 
 
The experiment was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ipeirotis, 2010) through a survey built on Qualtrics. Participants were randomly divided in 
three conditions. In the PGG-Baseline condition, they made a decision in a standard two-
player, one-shot, public goods game (see below for the details); in the PGG-Punishment 
condition, they made a decision in the same public goods game as in the baseline condition, 
but knowing that an observer will be informed about their decision and will have the 
opportunity to punish them; in the PGG-Reward condition, they made a decision in the same 
public goods game as in the baseline condition, but knowing that an observer will be 
informed about their decision and will have the opportunity to reward them. Specifically, in 
the PGG-Baseline condition each participant was informed that he or she would be paired 
with another participant, who was reading the same set of instructions. The two participants 
were named Participant A and Participant B. Both participants were informed that they 
started with 20 points. They were also informed that there was a common pool, with 0 points 
at the beginning of the experiment. The participants were told that they could choose to 
contribute, or not, all of their points to the common pool. No intermediate contributions were 
allowed. The total amount in the common pool was then multiplied by 1.5 and equally 
distributed between the two participants. This payoff structure implies that it is individually 
optimal for both participants to not contribute to the public good; however, if both 
participants do not contribute, then they receive a payoff of 20 points, which is less than what 
they would have gotten if they had both contributed (30 points). In the PGG-Punishment 
condition, the participants were additionally informed of the existence of a third participant, 
named Participant C. They were informed that Participant C would be given 40 points and 
would be told the decision of both Participant A and Participant B. Participant C could then 
use their points to deduct points from either Participant A or Participant B, or both. For every 
deduction point used by Participant C, the number of points of the target participant would be 
reduced by three. Participants C’s choices were collected separately (see Study 1). The PGG-
Reward condition was identical to the PGG-Punishment condition, with the only difference 
that the participants were informed that Participant C could use their points to add points to 
their account. For every addition point used by Participant C, the number of points of the 
target participant would be increased by three.  
Participants were informed that 1 point would correspond to 1 US cent. After reading the 
instructions, participants were asked some comprehension questions. Participants failing the 
comprehension questions were automatically excluded from the survey. Participants passing 
the comprehension questions were allowed to make their public good decision, after which 
they entered a demographic questionnaire, at the end of which they received the completion 
code needed to claim their payment through AMT. After the experiment was ended and after 
conducting also Study 1, we computed the bonuses and we paid them on top of the 
participation fee (50 cents). No deception was used. The design, the exclusion criteria, and 
the analysis were pre-registered at: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=tc76r2. 
 
Results 
 
As pre-registered, in case of multiple IP addresses or multiple Turk IDs, we keep only the 
first observation, as determined by the starting date. In doing so, we remain with a total of 
N=526 participants (47% females; mean age = 36.4). Comparing the rate of cooperation in 
the baseline with the rate of cooperation in the two treatments, we clearly see that both 
mechanisms (punishment and reward) increased cooperation. See Figure 1. Specifically, in 
the PGG-baseline condition, the rate of cooperation was 54.3% (in line with previous works 
using a similar payoff structure; Capraro, Jordan, & Rand, 2014), whereas in the PGG-
Punishment condition and in the PGG-Reward condition, the rates of cooperation were 
72.9% and 71.5%, respectively; both significantly higher than the rate of cooperation in the 
PGG-baseline condition (logistic regression; PGG-Punishment vs PGG-Baseline: b = 0.819, 
z = 3.30, p = 0.001; PGG-Reward vs PGG-Baseline: b = 0.751, z = 3.35, p = 0.001). There 
was no statistical difference between the rate of cooperation in the PGG-Punishment 
condition and the rate of cooperation in the PGG-Reward condition (p = 0.814). This is in 
line with the meta-analysis by Balliet, Mulder, and Van Lange (2011).  
 
In sum, the pre-study shows that knowing that they might be punished or rewarded by a third-
party, makes participants more cooperative in our one-shot two-player public goods game. 
Moreover, punishment and reward have virtually the same effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Rate of cooperation in the three conditions of the pre-study. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
Study 1 
 
In the pre-study, we collected the decisions of participants playing a public goods game 
knowing that a third-party will be informed about their decision and will have the possibility 
to punish or reward them. In Study 1, we collect the punishing and rewarding decisions. 
Since our goal is to explore whether women and men are punished (rewarded) differently 
when they defect (cooperate) in the public goods game, in Study 1 we implement a 2 (punish, 
reward) x 2 (female, male) between-subjects design. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants were randomly divided in four conditions, the Punish-Anna condition, the 
Punish-Adam condition, the Reward-Anna condition, and the Reward-Adam condition. In the 
Punish-Anna (Punish-Adam) condition, participants were shown the instructions of the PGG 
exactly as in the PGG-Punishment condition in the pre-study, with the only difference that 
Participant A was named Anna (Adam). After reading the instructions of the PGG, 
participants were given 40 points and were told that they could use these points to deduct 
points from the account of Anna (Adam) and/or Participant B. For every deduction point 
used, the account of the participant would be decreased by 1 point, while the account of Anna 
(Adam) or Participant B would be decreased by 3 points. The Reward-Anna (Reward-Adam) 
condition is identical, except for the fact that participants can use their points to add points to 
Anna’s (Adam’s) or Participant B’s account. For every addition point used, the account of the 
participant would be decreased by 1 point, while the account of Anna (Adam) or Participant 
B would be increased by 3 points. Participants were informed that 1 point would correspond 
to 1 US cent. After reading the instructions, participants were asked some comprehension 
questions to make sure they understood the game. Participants failing the comprehension 
questions were automatically excluded from the survey. Participants passing the 
comprehension questions were allowed to make their punishing (rewarding) decisions in 
eight different scenarios, one of which would be randomly selected to determine their 
payment. To make sure that participants passing the comprehension questions had also 
understood the gender of the participant they were asked to punish/reward, some of the 
questions contain the name Anna (Adam) and the gendered pronoun her (him). For example, 
one comprehension question was: “In Stage 1, what is the choice that Anna should make in 
order to maximize her number of points?” The eight scenarios corresponded to all four 
possible combinations of Anna’s (Adam’s) choice and the choice of Participant B times two, 
corresponding to whether the participant was asked to deduct/add Anna’s (Adam’s) points or 
Participant B’s points. After making their decisions, participants entered a demographic 
questionnaire, at the end of which they received the completion code needed to claim their 
payment through AMT. After the experiment was ended, we computed the bonuses (by 
randomly picking, for each participant in Study 1, a participant in the pre-study) and we paid 
them on top of the participation fee (50 cents). In this way, all decisions were incentivised 
and no deception was used. The design, the exclusion criteria, and the analysis were pre-
registered at: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=tc76r2. 
 
Results 
 
As pre-registered, in case of multiple IP addresses or multiple Turk IDs, we keep only the 
first observation, as determined by the starting date. In doing so, we remain with a total of 
N=1,077 participants (52% females; mean age = 38.2).  
 
Punishment 
 
Figure 2 reports the number of points used by the participant to punish Anna (Adam) and 
Participant B1, split by the public good contributions made by Anna (Adam) and Participant 
B. In the x-axis of the figure, the first component of each pair corresponds to the contribution 
made by the participant to be punished. For example, the first blue column represents the 
average number of points used to punish Adam when he contributes 20 points to the public 
good while the other participant contributes 0 points. Similarly, the last grey column reports 
the average number of points used to punish Participant B when s/he contributes 0 points to 
the public good while the other participant contributes 20 points. We clearly note that the 
extent to which a defector is punished strongly depends on the choice of the other player. 
Specifically, the average number of points used to punish a defector when their partner 
cooperates is 2.16, which is significantly higher than the average number of points used to 
punish a defector when the other person defects, which is 0.38 points (linear regression: b = 
1.781, t = 13.21, p <.001). In turn, the average number of points used to punish a defector 
when their partner defects is significantly greater than the average number of points used to 
 
1 Notice that there are two groups of subjects that are asked to punish Participant B, those in the Punish-Anna 
condition and those in the Punish-Adam condition. However, there is no significant different on how these 
subjects punish Participant B (all p’s > 0.273). Therefore, in the analysis we collapse the data of these two 
groups. Similarly, in the next subsection, we will collapse the data regarding rewarding Participant B. 
punish a cooperator2, both when their partner cooperates (0.22 points used to punish, on 
average; comparison vs. punishing a defector when their partner defects: b = 0.160, t=2.32, 
p=0.020) and when their partner defects (0.18 points used to punish, on average; comparisons 
vs. punishing a defector when their partner defects: b = 0.196, t=3.31, p=0.001). 
 
Coming to gender differences, we use linear regression to compare the number of points used 
to reward Adam, Anna, and Participant B. In total, there are twelve comparisons (four 
comparisons Adam vs. Anna, four comparisons Adam vs. Participant B, and four 
comparisons Anna vs. Participant B). None of these comparisons turn out to be statistically 
significant (all p’s > 0.263). Therefore, we find no evidence that Adam and Anna are 
punished differently. 
 
Next, as pre-registered, we study whether females and males punish at a different rate. To 
this end, we conduct linear regression predicting the number of points used to punish Adam, 
Anna, and Participant B, in each of the four cases (20,20), (20,0), (0,20) and (0, 0), for males 
and females separately. This generates a total of twenty-four comparisons. None of these 
comparisons turn out to be statistically significant (all p’s > 0.149). Therefore, we find no 
evidence that men and women punish Adam and Anna differently. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average number of points used by Participant C to punish Adam/Anna/Participant 
B, conditional on the contributions to the public good by Adam/Anna and Participant B. On 
the x-axis, the first component of each pair corresponds to the contribution made by the 
participant to be punished. For example, the first blue column represents the average number 
of points used to punish Adam when he contributes 20 points to the public good while the 
other participant contributes 0 points. Error bars represent the standard errors of the mean.  
 
Rewarding 
 
2 In line with previous work on anti-social punishment (Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008), we also find that a 
small proportion of participants punish cooperators. 
 
Figure 3 reports the number of points used by the participant to reward Anna (Adam) and 
Participant B, split by the contributions to the public good made by Anna (Adam) and 
Participant B. In the x-axis of the figure, the first component of each pair corresponds to the 
contribution made by the participant to be rewarded. For example, the first blue column 
represents the average number of points used to reward Adam when he contributes 20 points 
to the public good while the other participant contributes 0 points. We clearly note that 
cooperators are rewarded way more than defectors, especially when their partner defects. The 
average number of points used to reward a cooperator when their partner defects is 4.02, 
compared to the average number of points used to reward a cooperator when their partner 
cooperates, that is, 2.07 (b = 1.952, t = 7.09, p < 0.001). In turn, this is greater than the 
average number of points used to reward a defector, both when their partner defects (that is, 
the average is 0.57; b = 1.504, t = 6.95, p<0.001) and when their partner cooperates (the 
average is 0.66; b = 1.417, t = 6.25, p<0.001). No statistically significant difference is present 
between these two latter cases (p=0.604). We also observe that people use more points to 
reward (average = 1.854) than to punish (average = 0.741). The difference is statistically 
significant (b = 1.112, t = 12.30, p < .001).  
 
Coming to gender differences, we use linear regression to compare the number of points used 
to reward Adam, Anna, and Participant B. As in the punishment case, there are twelve 
comparisons and none of them turn out to be statistically significant (all p’s > 0.162). 
Therefore, we find no evidence that Adam and Anna are rewarded differently. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average number of points used by Participant C to reward Adam/Anna/Participant 
B, conditional on the contributions to the public good by Adam/Anna and Participant B. On 
the x-axis, the first component of each pair corresponds to the contribution made by the 
participant to be rewarded. For example, the first blue column represents the average 
number of points used to reward Adam when he contributes 20 points to the public good 
while the other participant contributes 0 points. Error bars represent the standard errors of 
the mean.  
 
 
Next, as pre-registered, we study whether females and males reward at a different rate. As in 
the punishment case, this generates a total of twenty-four comparisons, none of which turn 
out to be statistically significant (all p’s > 0.169). Therefore, we find no evidence that men 
and women reward Adam and Anna differently. 
 
Study 2 
 
Study 1 provides evidence that women and men do not discriminate between genders when 
they have to punish a defector or reward a cooperator. Study 2 aims to extend this finding to a 
different mechanism to judge someone’s behaviour. Specifically, in Study 2 participants are 
informed about the choice of Anna (Adam) and are asked to rate this choice from 1 star to 5 
stars. We believe this to be an interesting case because many online reputation systems are 
based on a similar rating system. This rating system was first studies in the context of social 
dilemmas played online by Capraro, Giardini, Vilone, and Paolucci (2016). In their paper, the 
authors showed that participants tend to rate cooperators higher than defectors and tend to 
prefer people with higher reputation as partners, even when they know nothing about how the 
reputation was acquired. However, they have no data regarding how people rate cooperators 
and defectors conditional on their gender. 
 
Method 
 
Participants were randomly divided in two conditions, the Rate-Adam condition and the Rate-
Anna condition. In the Rate-Adam (Rate-Anna) condition, participants were informed that 
Adam (Anna) and Participant B were playing a game. The game and the instructions were 
identical to the ones in the previous studies. After the instructions of the game, participants 
were asked some comprehension questions. Participants failing any comprehension question 
were automatically excluded from the survey. After the comprehension questions, 
participants were asked, in random order, to answer the following questions: (i) “Assume that 
Adam decided to contribute. How would you rate his behaviour? (Available answers: 1 star/2 
stars/3 stars/4 stars/5 stars); and (ii) “Assume that Adam decided to not contribute. How 
would you rate his behaviour? (Available answers: 1 star/2 stars/3 stars/4 stars/5 stars). After 
rating Adam (Anna), participants entered the demographic questionnaire, after which they 
were given the completion code needed to claim for their payment on Mechanical Turk. After 
the survey was over, participants were paid their participation fee (30 cents). The method and 
the analysis were pre-registered at: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=kr98xr. 
 
Results 
 
In case of multiple IP addresses or multiple Turk IDs, we keep only the first observation, as 
determined by the starting date. In doing so, we remain with a total of N=253 participants 
(45% females; mean age = 37.24). 
 
The average rating received by Adam when he cooperates is virtually identical to the average 
rating received by Anna, when she cooperates (4.22 vs. 4.21; linear regression: b = 0.010, t = 
0.08, p = 0.935). Similarly, the average rating received by Adam when he defects is virtually 
identical to the average rating received by Anna, when she defects (2.92 vs. 2.88; linear 
regression: b = 0.035, t = 0.24, p = 0.814). Also, splitting the sample by gender, we find that 
the average rating given to Adam by men when Adam cooperates is 4.19, which is very 
similar to the average rating given by women, which is 4.24 (b = 0.059, t = 0.45, p = 0.724). 
Similarly, the average rating given to Adam by men, when Adam defects is 2.96, is very 
similar to the average rating given by women, which is 2.86 (b = -0.111, t = -0.51, p = 0.609). 
Finally, also the average rating given to Anna by men when Anna cooperates is not 
statistically different from the average rating given to Anna by women (4.24 vs. 4.17; b = -
0.070, t = -0.43, p = 0.669); the same happens with the average rating given to Anna when 
she defects (2.73 by men vs. 3.07 by women; b = 0.334, t = 1.60, p = 0.112). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average rating received by Adam/Anna when he/she cooperates or defects. Error 
bars represent the standard errors of the mean.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Across two experiments, we showed that people do not discriminate between men and 
women when they are in charge of punishing a defector or rewarding a cooperator, at least in 
our idealised setting of a laboratory experiment where cooperative behaviour is measured 
through a one-shot public goods game. This held not only when punishment and reward were 
implemented using standard laboratory techniques (decrease/increase the payoff of the 
defector/cooperator; Study 1), but also when they were implemented using a technique 
inspired by the recent development of online rating systems (rating the behaviour of a 
defector/cooperator from 1 to 5 stars; Study 2). The results also held across genders: neither 
men nor women discriminated between genders when punishing/rewarding 
defectors/cooperators.  
 
This work goes beyond previous literature along several dimensions. As mentioned in the 
Literature Review section, previous research had mainly focused on whether men and women 
punish or reward differently (Solnick, 2001; García-Gallego et al. 2012; Bueno-Guerra et al. 
2016; Burnham, 2018). While this is an important and interesting case, it did not cover the 
mirror question of whether men and women are punished/rewarded differently. This latter 
question is also interesting, in particular because of the current discussion on gender parity. 
We do not hide, in fact, that this is what motivated us to start this research project. To date, 
many experiments have shown that women are penalized more than men when they display 
certain behaviours in the workplace; these behaviours include self-promotion (Rudman, 
1998), unhelping (Heilman and Chen, 2005), and initiation of negotiations (Babcock, 
Recalde, Vesterlund and Weingart, 2017); female instructors also receive lower ratings than 
their male counterparts (MacNell, 2015; Boring, 2017; Mengel, Sauermann, & Zölitz, 2019). 
Although these are all very important situations, they do not cover a case that we believe to 
be very important, not only in the workplace, but in every human society: cooperation. Are 
women punished more than men when they fail to cooperate? Are men rewarded more than 
women when they cooperate? In this paper, we moved a step towards addressing these 
questions. Of course, these questions can be asked in general, without any reference to the 
specific setting of the workplace. For the sake of generality, therefore, we placed ourselves in 
the idealised setting of a laboratory experiment; we did so to avoid any particular frame that 
might cause a loss of generality. In this general aseptic setting, our results speak quite clearly: 
people do not discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing 
(rewarding) defectors (cooperators). 
 
But, of course, generality comes with a cost. And the cost is precisely the fact that perhaps 
we found no gender discrimination exactly because we placed the participants in the idealized 
setting of a laboratory experiment. Had the participants been placed in a prototypically 
feminine cooperative setting, perhaps we would have observed women being punished more 
than men; symmetrically, had the participants been placed in a prototypically masculine 
cooperative context, perhaps, this time, we would have observed men being punished more 
than women. This suggests a direction for future research that we believe to be of primary 
interest, that is, manipulating the frame of the public goods game in order to make it more 
perceivably feminine vs. masculine, and study whether there is an asymmetry in the way the 
two genders are punished in “their own” prototypical public goods game. This, in turn, opens 
the sub-question of how one can frame the games in such a way to make them more gender 
salient. In one of her many illuminating articles, Alice Eagly (2009) suggests that prosociality 
among women is primarily directed towards other people, while prosociality among men is 
primarily directed towards groups and organisations. Therefore, perhaps one can develop 
public goods games with special frames that manipulate the saliency of who receives the 
benefit of the cooperative action, other people vs. the group. This is certainly worth exploring 
in future work. 
 
Another potential limitation of our work regards the way we manipulated the gender of the 
participant to be punished/rewarded, that is, by having punishers/rewarders reading the 
instructions of the public goods game where the decision makers were called Adam (Anna) 
and Participant B. This methodology can be criticised along (at least) two dimensions. First, 
it is possible that some participants did not know that Anna is a feminine name while Adam 
is a masculine name. Second, it is possible that some participants did not pay enough 
attention, and perhaps did not even read the names of the decision makers. Although we 
acknowledge these limitations, we do believe they are minor. In fact, we carefully wrote the 
instructions of the experiments with the goal of referring to the gender of the decision maker, 
either through the direct name, or through the pronouns, in several occasions; including in the 
comprehension questions. For example, one of the comprehension questions of Study 1 was 
“In Stage 1, what is the choice that Anna should make in order to maximize her number of 
points?” This question contains both the name “Anna” and the pronoun “her”. Taking into 
account that only participants who passed all the comprehension questions were allowed to 
complete the experiment, it is hard to believe that these participants did not understand the 
gender of the person to be punished/rewarded. 
 
In sum, our results showed that people do not discriminate between genders when they are in 
charge of punishing (rewarding) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot public goods game. 
Future work should explore what happens in gender-framed cooperation games. 
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